The Bioterrorism Panic

The Bioterrorism Panic

By Daniel S. Greenberg

Washington Post

March 16, 1999

No doubt there are nuts and demons out there planning evil things. But it should be noted that there's a whiff of hysteria-fanning and budget opportunism in the scary scenarios of the saviors who have stepped forward against the menace of bioterrorism. The rising din about bioterrorism is dominated by one faction -- people who say the problem exists, and they should be trusted and financed to deal with it. While a gullible press echoes its frightening warnings, there are no independent assessments of the potential for terrorist attacks or the practicality of the proposed responses.

Federal money is tight for health and human services, but the bioterrorism budget bandwagon is rolling in the Department of Health and Human Services. In response to a Presidential Decision Directive last May, $144 million was added to the paltry $14 million originally budgeted this year by the department for "bioterrorism preparedness." For the coming year, the White House proposes $230 million. Given the excited warnings emanating from supposedly expert quarters, even larger funds are bound to be requested and appropriated.

The money is intended for detection systems, training and coordinating response teams, and vaccine development and stockpiling. With terrorism certified by the Clinton administration as the foreign menace of the moment, the money comes easily from a compliant Congress. Who dares risk the opprobrium of being wrong?

In grantland, the opportunities in bioterrorism have been recognized. At Johns Hopkins University, there's a newly established Center for Biodefense Studies, the scope of whose activities "will depend substantially on the resources made available," according to a fact sheet from the center. For starters, it says, $1 million is required "if an impact is to be made in the near term." But $3 million to $5 million is described as "more appropriate as an investment for a problem of this magnitude and scope."

After a conference sponsored in February by the Center -- with attendance over 1,000 from some 18 countries -- the opportunities ahead were described in Washington Fax, a newsletter that circulates among Washington health lobbies: "Counter-bioterrorism," it reported, "requires an allocation of money and talent finite neither in amount nor time. Congress must understand the need to fund infrastructure support and the importance of an ongoing commitment to fight this shapeless threat." Duly noted at the conference were the leftovers from Soviet production of tonnage quantities of anthrax and other deadly substances, and the release of nerve gas in a Tokyo subway in 1995 by a fanatical religious sect.

Given the real possibility of events proving them horribly wrong, few doubters have gone public. However, skeptics quietly point out that deadly biological substances are difficult, though not impossible, to acquire, and are difficult to spread. Though nothing can be ruled out in the strategies of terrorism, the payoff from a germ attack -- assuming it can be carried out successfully -- is open to doubt. There can be little, if any, political or spiritual profit in the worldwide revulsion that would ensue.

Many of the measures proposed for countering bioterrorism are obviously useful for public-health emergencies unrelated to germ warfare. But their effectiveness against a skillful, determined attack, or even a crude amateur attack, is open to question. The menace is unknown, though probably far less than the alarmists would have us believe, and the proposed protections are unproven and probably in large part illusory.

Despite the panicky drumbeating, the public so far seems uninterested. With some members of the armed services refusing inoculation against anthrax because they dispute its safety and efficacy, similar non-cooperation can be anticipated in the civilian population. Though smallpox has been eliminated worldwide as a disease, it's considered possible that hidden stores of the smallpox virus might enter the bioterrorist arsenal. Since smallpox is highly infectious and deadly, the ideal defense would be a resumption of worldwide vaccinations against the disease. Does the terrorism threat warrant the gargantuan, costly effort that would be required? Who would pay for it?

Nasty people and the ingredients for bioterrorism were all in place over a decade ago. Why now the drumbeating? The bioterrorism panic invites many questions. So far, there are few answers.

Daniel S. Greenberg is a science journalist.