Military Chiefs Back Anthrax Inoculations
Initiative Would Affect All of Nation's Forces
By Bradley Graham
Washington Post
October 2, 1996
Reversing earlier opposition, the nation's military chiefs have endorsed a plan to vaccinate all U.S. forces against anthrax in what would be the Pentagon's first regular inoculation program against a germ warfare agent, Defense Department officials said.
The about-face by senior commanders removes the principal obstacle to the plan and reflects heightened Pentagon concern about the prospect of biological attack. Iraq, Russia and as many as 10 other countries are said by U.S. officials to have at least the capability to load spores of anthrax into weapons, although no country is known to have released the bacteria on a battlefield.
Military leaders initially were dubious about the need for the anthrax vaccine, instead favoring work on a multipurpose vaccine that could counter a number of biological warfare agents.
In addition, some commanders thought that the United States could deter an enemy from launching an anthrax attack simply by threatening massive retaliation -- an approach that worked in the Persian Gulf War in preventing Iraq from using biological and other unconventional weapons. Some military leaders also needed to be reassured the vaccine has no debilitating side effects. And some wondered whether the estimated $120 million it would cost to immunize 1.5 million military personnel could be better spent elsewhere.
But some senior civilian Defense Department officials, who ardently support the vaccination plan, ultimately convinced the military leaders during months of internal review that U.S. forces are vulnerable to deadly assault by anthrax and could be safely protected by immunization.
"The whole area of biological warfare was one not very familiar to the chiefs," a senior defense official said. "It's been a gradual process for the military to recognize the seriousness of the threat and understand the kind of protection that vaccination provides."
Defense officials were reluctant to discuss the vaccination initiative before final approval by the Pentagon's top civilians. Some officials fretted that word the United States is about to embark on a program to defend against anthrax might be misread as a sign Washington has a secret offensive capability or intends to develop one.
No such secret weapon or development plan exists, officials said. The United States renounced its germ warfare effort in 1969 and signed an international convention outlawing such weapons.
Anthrax tops the U.S. government's list of biological warfare threats. An infectious disease that normally afflicts animals, especially cattle and sheep, anthrax can be produced in a dry form ideal for storing and ground into tiny particles just right for inhaling by humans. As little as one hundredth of a millionth of a gram is enough to kill.
Anthrax spores are very stable and may remain viable for many years in soil and water. When inhaled, they cause severe pneumonia and death within a week.
Because of limited vaccine supplies, only about 150,000 of the more than 500,000 U.S. soldiers sent in 1990 and 1991 to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait in the Gulf War were inoculated against anthrax amid fears, never realized, that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein might unleash the germ.
Roughly 5,000 U.S. military personnel have continued to receive protection against anthrax because of their assignments. These include medical and emergency response teams, groups that handle hazardous material and some special forces units.
A 1993 Defense Department directive ordered a review of all biological warfare threats to U.S. forces and ways of combating them. But the anthrax issue did not bubble up to senior levels until last year.
Suggestions at the time by military officials to delay action and await development of a multipurpose vaccine were greeted warily by advocates of anthrax immunization.
"Such a vaccine is many years away from being invented, and many more years of clinical testing would be necessary before it could be applied," said a senior civilian official involved in the debate.
Military leaders also raised questions about safety of the anthrax vaccine given speculation that some of the "Gulf War Syndrome" maladies suffered by U.S. troops may have been caused by one or a combination of several vaccines administered. But research so far has shown no link between the anthrax vaccine, which is licensed by the Food and Drug Administration, and illnesses among Gulf War veterans.
Moreover, the vaccine is widely used in the United States and abroad among veterinarians, leather workers, laboratory technicians and others who have frequent contact with animals or animal products, where risk of exposure to anthrax is higher than normal.
Periodically this century, reports have surfaced of one nation or another developing anthrax weapons. In World War II, a Japanese military unit experimented with the bacteria on Russian and Chinese war prisoners, resulting in more than 1,000 deaths. In 1979, a cloud of anthrax spores was released accidentally from a Soviet military research facility in Sverdlovsk, killing several dozen people.
After the Gulf War, United Nations inspectors in Iraq were startled to discover how extensive and advanced Iraqi efforts had been to turn anthrax and other deadly biological agents into weapons.
To widen Pentagon understanding about anthrax, senior defense officials eager to institute a broad vaccination program departed from normal departmental practice this spring and organized two meetings that included vice chiefs of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps and civilian experts.
"The meetings were unusual in that we were starting at the top instead of trying to staff an issue from the bottom up," said one of the organizers. "But we considered this a threshold issue, and felt we ought to be able to do a better job of educating one another."
Ultimately, the service leaders accepted the need for an anthrax inoculation program; major regional commanders also backed the idea; and Gen. John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, agreed to recommend the initiative to Defense Secretary William J. Perry.
Defense officials considered vaccinating only units likely to be first into battle or to fight in certain regions. But complicating matters was the length of the inoculation process, which requires six doses spread over 18 months, plus annual boosters. Eventually, the option of selective inoculation was dismissed as too difficult to manage, since service members frequently rotate assignments.