Majority Of Military Gas Masks In Survey ‘Critically’ Defective

Pentagon Has Known Of Problems For Six Years

by John M. Donnelly

Defense Week

June 21, 2000

More than half the gas masks in the U.S. military have "critical" defects that might make them useless in protecting soldiers against gas or germ attacks, according to an internal Pentagon survey of thousands of masks obtained by Defense Week.

The Pentagon inspector general first alerted defense leaders about widespread defects in Army masks six years ago this month. But an internal debate about the significance of the findings has delayed solutions for years, while troops have remained at risk, say observers in the military and Congress. The closely held study of 19,218 masks in every military service found that 10,322 had at least one "critical" defect, meaning a problem that "has the potential to result in mask leakage and may impact on protection of the wearer."

For example, valves were dirty or leaking, drink tubes were disconnected and voice-emitters had missing gaskets, said the study, begun in 1997 and completed in November 1999 by a Pentagon panel called the Joint Service Integration Group. News of the defective masks comes four months after disclosures that the Pentagon distributed hundreds of thousands of chemical protective suits to troops, though it knew the suits’ maker was under investigation for defrauding the government with inferior merchandise. Top executives of the firm, Isratex, Inc., are now serving jail terms. The Army and Air Force have since recalled the suits.

Partly, the gas-mask defects were present when the masks came out of their boxes, and partly they were caused by normal wear and tear and poor maintenance, according to officials and documents. The November 1999 study faulted Army, Air Force and Navy leaders for not instilling in their troops the importance of proper upkeep of the masks.

It is the individual soldier’s responsibility to maintain his mask. But the November 1999 report, like the earlier ones, said "commanders do not provide enough emphasis on NBC (nuclear, chemical and biological) defense training and maintenance. Although there are inspection processes in place, their effectiveness is questionable as evidenced by the high visual defect rate. ... "

The Joint Service Integration Group is the joint commanders’ representative in the "chem-bio" acquisition bureaucracy. They tested the masks using production test equipment and visual surveillance. At issue are Army and Marine Corps M40 masks, the newest model, which replaces the M17 mask used in the Gulf War, the Air Force MCU-2/AP and the Navy MCU-2/P, also new masks. The Army owns more masks than any other service, officials say.

Though the mask problems have never come to public light, they are not news to many in the U.S. military. In a June 1994 report, the Defense Department inspector general warned about widespread defect rates in Army M40 and M17 masks. The Army participated in the audit but later contested its findings and got them classified as "secret," according to a defense official and Rep. Christopher Shays (R-Conn.), both of whom have tracked this issue behind the scenes for years.

Shays, chairman of the House Government Reform Committee’s national security panel, will hold a hearing today on problems with chemical and biological protective equipment, including the gas masks. In the six intervening years, rather than solve the problem by designing and fielding a tougher mask or by putting new emphasis on preventive maintenance, various military offices put their energy into denying the problem existed, says Shays and the defense official, who requested anonymity.

‘Services’ responsibility’

In fact, despite professing concerns about the threat of doomsday weaponry, Pentagon leaders still appear to be taking a hands-off approach to protecting soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines. Anna Johnson-Winegar, the official in charge of chemical and biological defense under Defense Secretary William Cohen, told Shays’ panel May 24 her office is the "focal point" of the issue in the military.

"In this position," she told lawmakers, "I am responsible for the oversight, coordination and integration of CB (chem-bio) defense medical and non-medical acquisition efforts, and for providing the specific guidance for planning, programming, budgeting and executing CB defense programs."

Yet, in a March 27 letter responding to a September 1999 request for action on the gas masks from the Pentagon inspector general, Johnson-Winegar explicitly rejected responsibility for addressing the defects. Instead, she said it was the services’ problem to equip and train the force.

"We are unable to accommodate your request to provide a time-phased implementation plan since any logistics sustainment issue such as this is the inherent responsibility of the services," she wrote. "There is no further requirement for OSD (the Office of the Secretary of Defense) to sponsor or conduct additional mask surveillance, and the issue is closed."

Johnson-Winegar did say that the results of the mask studies would be included in a joint "logistics support plan" to be sent to senior logistics commanders. The findings, she said, are under section 6, "other studies."

The inspector general had warned Johnson-Winegar: "Without specific actions by operational elements to implement a systemic fix to emphasize mask maintenance, the percentage of masks with defects is not likely to change." To that statement, she responded by referring the inspector general, again, to section 6.

Where does the buck stop?

Shays said of Johnson-Winegar: "She doesn’t train (the troops), she just needs to make sure they are well trained and if they’re not, she needs to call them on it. ... If she can’t do that, she needs to find another job."

Asked to comment, Johnson-Winegar said through a spokesman that she would appear today before Shays’ subcommittee, as will representatives of the armed forces.

"I don’t see how OSD can get away with ignoring such a critical readiness component," said the defense official, who also criticized the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "I find it very surprising that the warfighters haven’t been up in arms about this whole thing. ... For want of very modest amounts of money, things don’t get done. The department has made such a big deal out of the weapons of mass destruction threat, you would think there would be a whole lot more emphasis on this area."

Years of ‘coverup’

No reports were done on the issue between 1994 and the start of the latest survey in 1997 because the Secretary of Defense’s office "just couldn’t bring themselves to override the Army’s non-concurrence" with the 1994 report, said the defense official. Consequently, the Pentagon "frittered away five years."

The Army objected that the 1994 report’s test criteria were "too stringent," the official said, though the standards were "used by the Marine Corps and by the Army itself in every other type of survey any time anyone had thought there was a large-scale problem with fielded masks (since) ... the early 1980s."

To resolve the dispute over the issue between the inspector general and the Army, the Secretary of Defense’s office asked the Defense Science Board, a Pentagon advisory panel, to look at the problem. But the board, after some time considering the question, said it lacked the expertise to do such a study, the official said. Not until Shays intervened in 1997 to ask the Army to finally resolve the issue was the 1997-1999 Joint Service Integration Group survey begun, the official said.

"I believe the Army has continued to cover up the failure of the masks by denying the problem, making reports classified and then demanding tests that have been going on for six years after the original dispute," Shays said. "The Marine Corps uses a standard that is twice as stringent," he said, crediting the Marines with being ahead of the Army, Navy and Air Force in this area.

"Even new masks have been tested by the military and not found to meet the specs they were required to meet for purchase," he said. "The Army’s response is basically to say the (1994) test was too stringent, yet the test was only to meet what the Army said was the original spec.

"If the military had accepted the results (six years ago), they would have realized they need to develop a better mask that not only met the specs at delivery but also wore better and could take some of the rigors of battle," he said.

Nancy Ray, an Army spokeswoman, differed with that assessment. She said the Army didn’t feel the 1994 test standards were too tough, but rather "felt they were not the right criteria, they didn’t accurately reflect conditions that soldiers would face in the field using the masks. ... It’s not correct to say they don’t withstand rough treatment. It’s a fine piece of equipment ... but needs proper maintenance and care."

‘Immediate’ implications—six years ago

Ironically, the assistant inspector general wrote in an unclassified cover memo on the secret June 1994 report: "We are issuing this quick-reaction report so our recommendations can be implemented immediately, given the readiness implications of the test results."

Shays said a significant number of the masks surveyed in 1994 had problems, though the precise percentage is classified. Unclassified sections of a more detailed November 1994 follow-up report said that the Army masks were often dirty, damaged, scratched, twisted, loose or not properly reassembled after checks had been performed by soldiers.

Five years after the November 1994 report, the November 1999 study came out with the same bad news, this time applying to all the armed forces. According to Shays, the new study was not classified secret as the 1994 one was because, this time, the inspector general insisted that the results not be classified.