"I notice in today's Washington Post that the Department of Defense has responded by saying that it has got to beef up its public relations program. This is not a matter of PR as far as we are concerned. It is a matter of safety. The PR can come later. What we really need to do is not to attack the merits of the program but review thoroughly the questions of adequate safety guidelines, enforcement, oversight, and monitoring."
-- Senator William S. Cohen, Senate hearing on "Department of Defense Safety Programs for Chemical and Biological Warfare Research", 28 July 1988
DoD Officials:
Anonymous
(General Officer) -- Internet "Disinformation"
Anonymous (General
Officer) -- "urban legend"
Bacon, Ken (Asst
SecDef for Public Affairs) -- not taking vaccine himself
Bacon, Ken (Asst
SecDef for Public Affairs) -- adverse reactions
Bailey, Dr.
Sue (Asst SecDef for Health Affairs) -- safety and effectiveness
of anthrax vaccine
Blanck, LTG
Ronald (Surgeon General, US Army) -- adverse reactions
Blanck, LTG
Ronald (Surgeon General, US Army) -- "no known long-term
health consequences"
Clinton,
Bill (President and commander-in-chief) -- "the toll in lost
trust"
Cohen,
William S. (SecDef) -- AVIP Effectiveness
Cohen,
William S. (SecDef) -- dereliction of duty
Cohen,
William S. (SecDef) -- "fanatical terrorists and religious
zealots"
Cohen,
William S. (SecDef) -- "the anthrax threat is real"
Cohen,
William S. (SecDef) -- leadership accountability for force
protection
Cohen,
William S. (SecDef) -- four preconditions for AVIP
Cohen,
William S. (SecDef) -- "This is not a matter of PR..."
Cragin, Charles (Principal
Deputy Asst SecDef for Reserve Affairs) -- "no appreciable
impact"
Cragin,
Charles (Principal Deputy Asst SecDef for Reserve Affairs) --
"a BOER War analogy"
Friedlander,
Col (Dr.) Arthur, (US Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases) -- vaccine safety and efficacy
Hamre, Dr.
John (DepSecDef) -- undermine command authority
Hamre, Dr.
John (DepSecDef) -- science vs. emotion... or faith?
Krulak,
General Charles (former Commandant, USMC) -- "agenda for
trying to undo" AVIP
Oliver,
David (Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition)
-- "tried and proven"
Oliver,
David (Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition)
-- "You have to burn it "
Oliver,
David (Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition)
-- "inherently good people"
Quigley,
RADM Craig (Deputy Asst SecDef for Public Affairs) -- how many
have refused?
Strawder,
Major Guy (AVIP agency) -- "bizarre allegations"
Weaver,
MGen Paul (Director, ANG) -- Retention in the Air National Guard
Weaver,
MGen Paul (Director, ANG) -- On his false testimony to Congress
West, MGen
Randall, USMC, (Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Anthrax and Biological Defense) -- disappointment with the
congressional [Shays] report
Anonymous (General Officer) -- Internet "Disinformation"
| DoD Spin:"I think a lot of
it has to do with the Internet age. There's this
tremendous amount of information out there that our
youngsters can go right to the net and pull down
information, and in fact there's a lot of disinformation
on the Internet. Very, very aggressive, I think,
disinformation about the [anthrax] program. We have a
different generation today and they have that access to
that." DoD press briefing on anthrax vaccine, 5 Aug 1999 Fact:"In the Military Climate/Culture Survey and associated focus groups, many officers and NCOs -- well informed through the Internet and by other means -- expressed disappointment in their senior service leaders...such a perceptions gap -- complicated by the need for senior military leaders to support administration policy while also speaking for their service or command -- can erode the trust that is essential to the chain of command. " Center for Strategic and International Studies Report, 10 Jan 2000 Fact:"Though one could raise fundamental questions about the likelihood of anthrax use, and there are a dozen other biological agents that adversaries will now likely pursue with greater rigor given universal anthrax vaccination, the two sides are locked in a more fundamental debate... this is the Pentagon versus its own service members. It is a depressing window into the breakdown of discipline and basic confidence in the political and military leadership. That has nothing to do with the Web." Washington Post dot.mil article, 27 Sep 1999 |
Anonymous (General Officer) -- "urban legend"
| DoD Spin: "The first [issue]
that's sort of hanging in the background and I think
needs a direct answer is the FDA having to shut the plant
down for renovations. That's another one of those
urban legends or something that just keeps cropping up.
We planned to shut the plant down to modernize it... " DoD press briefing, 5 Aug 1999 Fact: "FDA conducted an inspection of MBPI in November 1996. During that inspection, FDA investigators documented numerous significant deviations from the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, FDA&rsquos regulations and the standards in MBPI&rsquos license. Based upon the documented deviations, FDA issued a Notice of Intent to Revoke Letter (NOIR) to MBPI in March 1997. The NOIR letter did not mandate the closure of the facility or lead to seizure of finished product. The letter, however, did state that if MBPI&rsquos corrective actions proved to be inadequate, they would run the risk of having their license revoked." FDA Center For Biologics Evaluation And Research, testimony to Congress, 29 Apr 1999 Fact: DR. ROBERT MYERS: "... we received on March 11th, 1997 a letter of notice of intent to revoke in which the agency notified us that they would initiate proceedings to revoke our license unless we did certain things." UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: "Did that notice apply to any parts of the facilities involved in the anthrax vaccine manufacturing process?" DR. ROBERT MYERS: "Yes. It was gone. It was everybody." Q/A session during an AVIP conference at Ft Detrick, MD, 25 May 1999 (not online) |
Bacon, Ken (ASD/PA) -- on not taking the anthrax vaccine himself
| DoD Spin: Reporter: Have you taken the shot? Bacon: I haven't. I've thought often about it. I certainly have no hesitation to take the shot. Reporter: Why are you hesitating then? (Laughter) Bacon: You know, I probably should review my entire shot record and go in and get new DPT shots and everything else that are probably up to date for my children but not up to date for me. Reporter: You go to the Persian Gulf regularly. Bacon: I do. I do. That's why I thought that I should take these shots. Maybe some day I'll come here and tell you that I've taken the shot. DoD press briefing, 21 Jan 1999 Fact: Mr. Bacon's comments speak for themselves.
If a servicemember gave the same response to their
commander they would (and have been) court-martialed and
jailed. |
Bacon, Ken -- adverse reactions to anthrax vaccine
| DoD Spin: " It's proven
itself safe and reliable. It works, and it does not
have side effects... We have given now I think shots
to nearly 170,000 people in the military... All these
people are fine." DoD press briefing, 21 Jan 1999 DoD Spin: " I've had three shots. My hair is growing more robust than ever. (Laughter) I sleep better. I eat better, run farther. It's been nothing but a great experience. (Laughter)" DoD press briefing, 29 Jun 1999 Fact: Dr. Renate Engler, the chief of immunology at Walter Reed Army Medical Center addressed a conference on the anthrax vaccine policy at Ft Detrick Maryland on 25-27 May 1999. During her address she described "Chronic Illness Perceived as Linked to Anthrax Vaccine: Dover AFB". She went on to observe:
These patients described by Dr. Engler in her
briefing reported having chronic systemic reactions
to the anthrax vaccine during the Fall of 1998 -- well
before Mr. Bacon's comments discrediting the idea of
serious adverse reactions to the vaccine. |
Bailey, Dr. Sue (ASD/HA) -- safety and effectiveness of anthrax vaccine
| DoD Spin: "The vaccine has
been shown to be safe and effective... Anthrax vaccine
has been shown to be extremely safe... This vaccine
is thought at this point to be effective
against all the strains we know about." DoD press briefing, 14 Aug 1998 DoD Spin: " This vaccine is as safe, and at times recorded to be safer than some of the vaccines that we give to children in America. We are actually seeing fewer side effects than might have been expected... So, this vaccine has been shown to be not only effective, but in fact safe, and on par with other vaccines that we give. We are continuing to monitor those side effects, though." DoD press briefing, 13 Dec 1999 Fact: "The obligation assumed by MBPI [manufacturer] under this contract involves unusually hazardous risks associated with the potential for adverse reactions in some recipients and the possibility that the desired immunological effect will not be obtained by all recipients. Although AVA has been extensively tested under the auspices of the Food and Drug Administration, the size of the proposed vaccination program may reveal unforewarned idiosyncratic adverse reactions. Moreover, there is no way to be certain that the pathogen used in tests measuring vaccine efficacy will be sufficiently similar to the pathogen that U.S. forces might encounter to confer immunity. These concerns, coupled with the uncertain and evolving state of product liability law with regard to vaccines, lead me to the conclusion that the performance of this contract will subject MBPI to certain unusually hazardous risks." DoD memorandum indemnifying the anthrax vaccine manufacturer, 3 Sep 1998 |
Blanck, LTG Ronald, (Army Surgeon General) -- adverse reactions
| Fact: "Eight reports
discussed Service Members hospitalized with an illness
coincidentally related to anthrax vaccination. Five have
recovered completely. Among the five Service Members who
recovered, the reports described the events as one case
each of Guillain-Barre&rsquo syndrome,
multiple sclerosis, angioedema
involving the left jaw, aseptic meningitis,
and severe injection site inflammation.
Three of the eight Service Members hospitalized with an
illness coincidental to their anthrax vaccination have
ongoing conditions: bipolar psychiatric disorder,
diabetes mellitus and systemic
lupus erythematosus...
" DoD Spin: "... Notably, the AVEC [DoD's anthrax vaccine "expert" committee] judged the injection site inflammation event as the only case likely caused by the vaccine." Testimony to House Armed Services Committee, 30 Sep 1999 Fact: "I think it speaks to the undercurrent of distrust of the government and the military," said Lt. Gen. Ronald R. Blanck, the surgeon general of the Army, the service that oversees the vaccination program. "Agent Orange. Nuclear tests in the '50s. People say, `How can you say this is safe?' Clearly, we have a credibility problem." |
Blanck, LTG Ronald, (Army Surgeon General) -- no known long-term health consequences
| DoD Spin: " The surgeon
general noted that there are no known long-term health
consequences to the vaccine, which can counter more
than 30 anthrax strains. About 500 employees at the
Army's Medical Research and Materiel Command at Fort
Detrick, Md., have received the vaccine since the 1970s
and have evidenced no signs of illness related to the
vaccine, he pointed out. Blanck attributed problems in
some units to a lack of education. " quoted in DoD news service article, 7 Oct 1999 Fact: "Although anthrax vaccine had been considered approved prior to the Persian Gulf War, it was rarely used. Therefore, its safety, particularly when given to thousands of soldiers in conjunction with other vaccines, is not well established. Anthrax vaccine should continue to be considered as a potential cause for undiagnosed illnesses in Persian Gulf military personnel because many of the support troops received anthrax vaccine, and because the DoD believes that the incidence of undiagnosed illnesses in support troops may be higher than that in combat troops." Fact: "The long- term safety of the vaccine has not yet been studied." testimony before the National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations Subcommittee, House Committee on Government Reform, 29 Apr 1999 ("Medical Readiness: Safety and Efficacy of the Anthrax Vaccine", T-NSIAD-99-148.) |
Clinton, Bill (President and commander-in chief) -- "the toll in lost trust"
| Spin: "&hellipthis is
about more than saving lives -- it about more than money
-- and it's even about more than saving lives because
it's about the toll in lost trust in the health care
system&hellipWe also want to replace what some
call a culture of silence with a culture of safety;
an environment that encourages others to talk about
errors, what caused them and how to stop them in the
first place." Commander-in-Chief of the US Armed Forces, remarks by the President on medical errors, 22 Feb 2000 Fact: "The AVIP should be suspended because it lacks an essential element in a medical program: trust&hellip Trust must be earned. It can be earned only with a degree of candor and openness that has not been the hallmark of the AVIP to date. While claiming a new awareness of the need for effective risk communication, the Pentagon still reverts to absolutist declarations, heavy handed propaganda, and ad hominem attacks whenever the risks of the anthrax vaccine are communicated too effectively or persistently. In a culture based on a chain of command and the power to compel, attempts at persuasion and education often devolve into intimidation. Labeling opponents "paranoics" and ridiculing the intelligence or courage of those with legitimate questions are not the methods of modern risk communication." |
Cohen, William, SecDef -- AVIP effectiveness
| Spin: "But
this is a program that's working well. And it's
important that any time we send men and women into a
theater where they could be exposed to a biological
agent, that they have whatever protection we can provide
to them that's safe and effective. And that's clearly the
situation we have now." press briefing, Dover AFB, 15 Dec 1999 . Fact: "... The mandatory requirement to take Anthrax shots is another major morale beater. Many warriors simply don't trust this inoculation designed to prevent mass casualties during a germ attack. Literally thousands are choosing to walk rather than risk the suspected side effects." Defending America column, 23 Nov 1999 |
Cohen, William S. (SecDef) -- dereliction of duty
| DoD Spin: "Cohen
said he ordered the mandatory shots because he was
deploying troops to the Persian Gulf, where chemical and
biological weapons could be used. He said U.S. officials
had learned that Saddam Hussein was making weapons with
biological agents. 'I would be derelict in my duties
sending you out in an environment in which you weren't
properly protected,' he said." speaking to airmen at Al Jaber Air Base, Kuwait, 9 Mar 1999 Fact: "The nature and magnitude of the military threat of biological warfare (BW) has not changed since 1990, both in terms of the number of countries suspected of developing BW capability, the types of BW agents they possess, and their ability to weaponize and deliver those BW agents." GAO National Security and International Affairs Division, testimony to Congress, 29 Apr 1999 |
Cohen, William S. (SecDef) -- "fanatical terrorists and religious zealots"
| DoD Spin: "Also
looming is the chance that these terror weapons will find
their way into the hands of individuals and independent
groups -- fanatical terrorists and religious zealots
beyond our borders, brooding loners and self-proclaimed
apocalyptic prophets at home. This is not hyperbole.
It is reality." Washington Post, 26 Jul 1999 Fact: " U.S. policy-makers and several outside analysts have predicted catastrophic consequences if a terrorist group or an individual-alone or with state sponsorship-ever mounts a major chemical or biological attack... But these scenarios have not drawn on a careful assessment of terrorist motivations and patterns of behavior... Contrary to the conventional wisdom about the catastrophic nature of chemical and biological terrorism, actual attacks were few in number, small in scale, and generally produced fewer casualties than conventional bombs." former biological weapons inspector in Iraq, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Jul/Aug 1999 Fact: "Nothing supports these propositions. They are exaggerated and alarmist. They are probably even dangerous and counterproductive, since they virtually solicit and induce precisely what they portray as fearing... The portrayal of this subject by senior government officials is grossly exaggerated, and the government's policy is accordingly based either on faulty assessments or no assessment at all." Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, Washington Post, 14 Aug 1999 Fact: "In 1996, the FBI counted 37 WMD cases in the United States; in 1997, 74; in 1998, 181, and in the first 10 months [1999], "more than 225." In roughly three-quarters of those cases, the perpetrator threatened to release a biological agent, usually anthrax--probably because anthrax is widely recognized and feared. None of the threats was determined to be "credible," according to the FBI." Washington Post, 26 Dec 1999 |
Cohen, William S. (SecDef) -- the "threat is real"
| DoD Spin: "The
anthrax threat is real, and we are carrying out a
prudent, safe program to counter the dangers." Washington Post, 6 Feb 2000 Fact: "... since 1900 there have only been seventy-one known terrorist acts worldwide involving the use of chemical or biological agents. Of the 123 fatalities these attacks caused, only one was American. As for biological attacks worldwide, seventy have occurred in the last century causing nine deaths but only eighteen of these seventy attacks were made by terrorists. These are not large numbers." Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Washington, D.C., Foreign Policy Research Institute abridged essay, Orbis, Spring 2000 Fact: "... here's a question that often gets lost as Congress prepares to spend $10 billion on counter-terrorism this year: Do you know how many people have died in chemical or biological terrorist attacks in America in the last 100 years? The answer is one. |
Cohen, William (SecDef) -- accountability for force protection
| DoD Spin: " Personal
accountability is not simply a question of assigning
blame. It involves understanding the obligations of
leadership, defining command responsibility, and
clarifying the high standards of performance that we
expect from commanders who are entrusted with the safety
of our troops... force protection is first and foremost
the responsibility of the commander on the scene." DoD press briefing announcing on the Khobar Towers bombing, 31 Jul 1997 Fact: "As a health care effort, the AVIP compromises the practice of medicine to achieve military objectives... Preposterously low adverse report rates generated by DOD point to a program far more concerned with public relations than effective force protection or the practice of medicine... The AVIP raises an ominous question: Who protects the force from ill-conceived force protection?" Fact: "...the biological defense program seems to be lacking the superstructure for lines of accountability and monitoring and lacking a central office that would monitor the safety programs. So we have to presume -- we have to presume -- that these programs are being carried out in a safe fashion. And, without paraphrasing a poet, do we dare presume in this particular case? I thinks that's really what we have to look at today. Perhaps we are presuming too much if we make the presumption that this is being carried out consistent with adequate standards and safeguards."
-- Senator William S. Cohen, "Department of Defense
Safety Programs for Chemical and Biological Warfare
Research", hearings before the Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management, Committee on
Government |
Cohen, William (SecDef) -- four preconditions for AVIP
| DoD Spin: "...
before launching the vaccination program, I took steps
to make sure that four important conditions were met:
I ordered supplemental testing consistent with FDA
standards to ensure that the vaccine supplies were
sterile, safe, potent and pure; I instructed the services
to design a system for tracking personnel who
received the required six shots; I had the services
develop plans for educating people about the
program; and I ordered an independent review of
the health and medical protocols of the program. The
vaccinations began in 1998 after these conditions were
met." Washington Post, 6 Feb 2000 Fact: "Mr. Secretary, you had set four specific conditions that had to be met before the vaccination program could start... According to the hearing testimony before the Subcommittee, none of these conditions was satisfactorily addressed before the vaccine program was implemented." letter to SecDef Cohen, 20 Jul 1999(See letter for a detailed critique of the "four important conditions") Fact: " The Defense Department was looking for some [sic] to review the program in general and make suggestions, and I accepted out of patriotism. I was very clear that I had no expertise in Anthrax and they were very clear they were looking for a general oversight of the vaccination program." Yale Medical School gynecologist, SecDef Cohen's "independent expert", letter to Congress, 26 Apr 1999 |
Cohen, William (SecDef)
-- "This is not a matter of PR..."
| DoD Spin:
"At an internal strategy meeting called last month
by Deputy Defense Secretary John J. Hamre, Pentagon
officials conceded that more should have been done to
explain the program to service members, according to
several participants. "Science is not winning this
debate; emotion is," said a senior officer who
attended the meeting. Hamre has ordered stepped-up
efforts to educate troops about the need for the vaccine
and to dispel fears of side effects. He also has sought
greater involvement by four-star regional commanders in
selling the program." -- "Anthrax Shots Missing Targets?", by Bradley Graham (Washington Post) Fact: "I notice in today's Washington Post that the Department of Defense has responded by saying that it has got to beef up its public relations program. This is not a matter of PR as far as we are concerned. It is a matter of safety. The PR can come later. What we really need to do is not to attack the merits of the program but review thoroughly the questions of adequate safety guidelines, enforcement, oversight, and monitoring." -- Senator William S. Cohen, "Department of Defense Safety Programs for Chemical and Biological Warfare Research", hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Committee on Government Affairs, US Senate, 27-28 July 1988 (Congressional Record - not online) |
Cragin, Charles (Principal Deputy Asst SecDef for Reserve Affairs) -- "no appreciable impact"
| DoD Spin: "...
recent recruiting and retention trends do not show any
substantial increase or decrease attributable to the
anthrax vaccination program. And although the military
recruiting market has posed significant challenges to all
Services, both active and reserve, in the past few years,
we currently see no appreciable impact as a result of
implementation of the anthrax vaccination program." testimony to Congress, 29 Sep 1999 (not online) Fact: "The Subcommittee has received an unconfirmed report that you were provided detailed information about a substantial number of pending resignations and transfer requests attributable to the anthrax vaccine program during your visit to Stewart Air Force Base... in September [1999]... Please provide a detailed description... " Fact: "During a meeting with Wing officials... [they] gave me a list detailing pending resignations and retirements. I attach a copy of that list, which indicated that 21 personnel were due to retire or resign as of January 1, 2000. Of these, 17 had listed anthrax as their reason for doing so." letter to Rep Christopher Shays, 21 Oct 1999 (not online) Fact: Slides given to Mr. Cragin at Stewart Air National Guard Base (attached to his letter to Congress) indicate that the 105th Airlift Wing projected that it would retain only 57% of their pilots by 1 Jan 2000 if the anthrax vaccination occurred. The anthrax vaccine shots were cancelled a few days after Mr. Cragin's visit and have not been rescheduled. |
Cragin, Charles (Principal Deputy Asst SecDef for Reserve Affairs) -- "a Boer War analogy"
| DoD Spin: "...
In closing, let me share a true story from an earlier era.
In 1898, the British were preparing to fight the Boer War.
Their senior leadership considered giving all their
troops the recently approved Typhoid Vaccine. Opposition
arose, some protests were held, some in their Parliament
objected, and that vaccine was made voluntary. Fourteen
thousand troops elected to take the shot. The troops went
to war and 59,000 came down with typhoid. Nine thousand
of them died while a perfectly safe and effective vaccine
remained on the shelf. We cannot allow the last chapter
of the anthrax story to be a BOER War analogy!" -- Charles Cragin, acting as Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness, letter to Congress,
16 May 2000 (not online) -- Mohammed N. Akhter, MD, MPH,
Executive Director, American Fact: "There is a
paucity of published peer-reviewed literature on the
safety of the anthrax vaccine... The committee concludes
that in the peer-reviewed literature there is inadequate/
insufficient evidence to determine whether an association
does or does not exist between anthrax vaccination and
long-term adverse health outcomes. This finding means
that the evidence reviewed by the committee is of
insufficient quality, consistency, or statistical power
to permit a conclusion regarding the presence or absence
of an association between the vaccine and a health
outcome in humans." |
Friedlander, Col (Dr.) Arthur, (US Army) -- vaccine safety and efficacy
| DoD Spin: "All
the serious adverse events noted, other than local
reactions, occur in the absence of immunization [i.e.
after the injection needle is withdrawn from the
servicemember] and it may not be possible to
demonstrate a cause and effect relationship... While
the possibility of a rare, previously unknown adverse
effect occurring during large-scale use of AVA [anthrax
vaccine] exists, there is no evidence that such
problems have occurred in nearly 30 years of use...
" Fact: "The current vaccine against anthrax is unsatisfactory for several reasons. The vaccine is composed of an undefined crude culture of supernatant adsorbed to aluminum hydroxide. There has been no quantification of the protective antigen content of the vaccine or of any of the other constituents, so the degree of purity is unknown. Standardization is determined by an animal potency test. The undefined nature of the vaccine and the presence of constituents that may be undesirable may account for the level of reactogenicity [adverse reactions] observed. The vaccine is also less than optimal in that six doses are required over 18 months, followed by annual boosters. There is also evidence in experimental animals that the vaccine may be less effective against some strains of anthrax. Clearly a vaccine that is completely defined, that is less reactogenic, and that requires on or two doses to produce long-lasting immunity would be highly desirable." |
Hamre, Dr. John (DepSecDef) -- "undermine command authority"
| DoD Spin: "Several
lawmakers criticized military leaders for failing keep
close track of the number of refusals to take the
vaccinations. But Hamre said he was reluctant to count
refusals through a central tracking system because it
would undermine command authority." Fact: If servicemembers and Congress knew the true magnitude of the number of refusals, court-martials, administrative discharges, resignations, and retirements then military commanders would be unable to enforce the anthrax vaccination policy. |
Hamre, Dr. John (DepSecDef) -- science vs. emotion... or faith?
| DoD Spin: "At
an internal strategy meeting called last month by Deputy
Defense Secretary John J. Hamre, Pentagon officials
conceded that more should have been done to explain the
program to service members, according to several
participants. "Science is not winning this
debate; emotion is," said a senior officer who
attended the meeting. Hamre has ordered stepped-up
efforts to educate troops about the need for the vaccine
and to dispel fears of side effects. He also has sought
greater involvement by four-star regional commanders in
selling the program." "Anthrax Shots Missing Targets?", Washington Post, 29 Sep 1999 Fact: " At best, the vaccine provides some measure of protection to most who receive it. Just how much protection is acquired, by whom, for how long, and against what level of challenge are questions DoD answers with an excess of faith but a paucity of science. Many servicemembers of the armed forces do not share that faith." |
Krulak, Gen Charles (Commandant, USMC) -- "agenda... to undo" AVIP
| DoD Spin: "I
am aware that misinformation and rumors abound concerning
the anthrax vaccination program. I
also believe that much of the incorrect information found
on the internet is being disseminated by persons who have
their own reasons and agenda for trying to undo this
critical force protection program...
" DoD Spin: "People are petrified that their penis is going to fall off, yet it is the safest vaccine ever given to American citizens... " Fact: "Today," says retired Admiral Stanley Arthur, who commanded U.S. naval forces during the Gulf War, "the armed forces are no longer representative of the people they serve. More and more, enlisted [men and women] as well as officers are beginning to feel that they are special, better than the society they serve. This is not healthy in an armed force serving a democracy." Fact: " But in spite of furious efforts by the Pentagon to tamp down what it considers insidious misinformation about the vaccine, the resistance continues. Efforts have included senior officers taking the vaccine in public and an unusual memorandum to all Marines from the Marine Corps commandant, Gen. Charles C. Krulak." "Armed Services opt to discharge those who refuse vaccine", New York Times, 11 Mar 1999 |
Oliver, David (PD/USD -- Acquisition) -- "tried and proven facility"
| DoD Spin: "Essentially
what we did was tore down that tried
and proven facility, which is the
same facility that's produced all the vaccine that people
have taken and will take under phase one, and we're
building a whole new facility." DoD press briefing, 13 Dec 1999 Fact: "The FDA inspections of the facility where the licensed vaccine was manufactured uncovered numerous problems. The facility received warning letters from FDA, including one in March 1997 stating its intent to revoke the facility's license. The facility closed its plant in 1998 and is now being renovated." testimony before the National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations Subcommittee, House Committee on Government Reform, 29 Apr 1999 ("Medical Readiness: Safety and Efficacy of the Anthrax Vaccine", T-NSIAD-99-148.) Fact: "While these deviations were documented in the most recent inspection, we note that significant deviations have been documented during previous FDA inspections of May 4 through May 7, 1993; May 31 through June 3, 1994; and April 24 through May 5, 1995. The seriousness of these deficiencies was emphasized to you in a letter dated December 22,1993, and a Warning Letter dated August 31, 1995. Based on the nature and number of the deficiencies identified during the recent inspection, it is the agency's judgment that management of the Michigan Biologic Products Institute has not fulfilled its responsibilities to exercise control in all matters relating to compliance with federal regulations and the applicable standards of your establishment and product licenses, or to assure that personnel are adequately trained and supervised" |
Oliver, David (PD/USD -- Acquisition) -- " You have to burn it "
| DoD Spin: Reporter: "I am wondering why you tore it down before the new one was certified?" Mr. Oliver: "I don't know. That was a different decision. But I'll give you a reason why I might have made that if I were in his place... " Reporter: "I guess that brings me back to Jim's question, which is, Why tear it down? You said it was a tried-and-true facility that was working. Why tear it down before you have another tried-and-true facility? When you look back on the decision, do you think that was a smart -- " Mr. Oliver: "I was driving west at the time -- " (laughter). Reporter: "Do you think it was a smart decision?" Mr. Oliver: "I was driving west, I was looking at the sunset -- I don't know." Reporter: "You have --" Reporter: "Can you answer that, please?"... Reporter: "Just explain -- is this what you meant, then, that to build another facility alongside of it, then to close down the facility afterwards, you can't ever reuse it, you'd have to do some big, like, Superfund cleanup to get rid of all the anthrax, or what -- is that the idea?" Mr. Oliver: "You have to burn -- yes." Reporter: "You burn it down." Mr. Oliver: "You have to burn it." DoD press briefing, 13 Dec 1999 Fact: Mr. Oliver's repeated evasive answers are intended to obscure the consequences of DoD's decision to destroy and burn the old anthrax vaccine production line: it precludes the old line from being used as evidence in a criminal prosecution of government and Bioport/MBPI officials into negligent manufacturing practices that have caused long-term systemic adverse reactions in servicemembers. |
Oliver, David (PD/USD -- Acquisition) -- "inherently good people "
| DoD Spin: Reporter: But if they're [Bioport] the only producer in the country, what's the stick for getting this solved? Why does it -- what avoids it (sic) from just drifting on and being a problem forever? Mr. Oliver: Because I think the [Bioport] people are inherently good people. The people are inherently good people. People understand the problem. We're going to put a lot of assets in this. This is no different than all the depots that exist across this great country and lots of other things for which the government runs, because it feels like it must. It's absolutely no different. And the reason that works is because you have good people. DoD press briefing, 13 Dec 1999 Fact: " Bioport Corp. was created solely to take over the assets of MBPI by Admiral Crowe, his partners in a company called Intervac L.L.C. and a group of former managers of the Michigan-based institute... Crowe owns 22.5 percent of Intervac shares, though he hasn&rsquot "invested a penny" in the venture... Fuad El-Hibri appears to be the real day-to-day director of Intervac and is listed by Dun & Bradstreet as the "chief executive" of Bioport... . Experts in defense policy suggested that the Pentagon would be highly unlikely to approve the sale to a foreign national of a company that is the sole manufacturer of a vaccine considered vital to national security." "Anthrax Cloud&rsquos Silver Lining", ABC News, 12 Mar 1999 Fact: "Whatever their flaws or merits, vaccines continue to draw the interest of small companies eager to gain a foothold in an expanding area of the federal budget. On July 7 [1998], the state of Michigan approved the sale of the nation's only licensed maker of anthrax vaccine to a company led by Admiral William Crowe, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who was an important supporter of Clinton's in the 1992 presidential campaign. "Germ Defense Plan in Peril as Its Flaws Are Revealed", New York Times, 7 Aug 1998 Fact:Like Admiral Crowe, "Mister" Oliver is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and a former career naval officer. He retired as a Rear Admiral. |
Quigley, RADM (DASD/PA) -- how many have refused the vaccine?
| DoD Spin: Reporter: I don't get it. If you don't track the numbers, explain to me how you know it's just 200 or 300 and is Congressman Jones inaccurate in what he... Rear Admiral Quigley: Again our estimate, and it's just that, is 200 or 300. These are some of the actual judicial proceedings throughout the military. So that is much easier. But administrative actions which are by far more numerous in number, we're not going to keep track of those. Reporter: Do you have any idea how many people have faced administrative action for refusing their anthrax shot? Rear Admiral Quigley: Perhaps on an individual service level, but it's not something that we're going to make a conscious decision to track the numbers here, again for that very reason. The influence that that might provide to limit a local commander's discretion as to how he or she feels best to handle it. Reporter: So is it correct that the number 200-300 is based on a review of judicial proceedings, and you actually have no precise idea how may people have refused the shot? Rear Admiral Quigley: It is not only judicial proceedings because there have been some very high profile, non-judicial proceedings here and there throughout the military as well. So no, it is just that. It is an estimate. It's a rough estimate. We have no intention of going with more precision than that. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, DoD press briefing, 30 Sep 1999 Fact: DoD leadership does not want to know the truth about the retention impact of the anthrax vaccine, so they don't ask the question. In November 1999, Rep George Nethercutt (R-WA) formally asked DoD how many servicemembers had been disciplined for refusing the anthrax vaccine. Three months later DoD has not answered. |
Strawder, Major Guy (AVIP agency) -- "bizarre allegations"
| DoD Spin: "Much
of the hand-wringing and bizarre allegations about the
vaccine is coming from a vocal minority of people who
think the "field" is where a farmer works and
"Gortex" is one of the Power Rangers. Most
of these folks have never spent a single moment in
harm&rsquos way and have no appreciation of what that
sacrifice means&mdashand they openly resent the
limited budget currently used to finance our
nation&rsquos defense... ... Unfortunately,
those of us who actually have to fight our nation's wars
can&rsquot afford such childlike optimism about the
world we live in. Other groups
believe that we are spreading a virus through
vaccinations that will weaken our military and allow the
uprisal of the New World Order. I don&rsquot make
this stuff up ladies and gents&mdashit&rsquos too
rich even for Hollywood." Fact: "Richard H. Kohn, a former chief historian of the Air Force who now teaches at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, argues that the officer corps has changed since the Cold War in the way it acts and feels. "I sense an ethos that is different," he told me in an interview. "They talk about themselves as 'we,' separate from society. They see themselves as different, morally and culturally. by Tom Ricks, The Atlantic Monthly, July 1997 Fact: All of those court-martialed, jailed, and discharged from the military for refusing the anthrax vaccine are loyal Americans who volunteered to serve their country and swore an oath to defend it against all enemies -- foreign and domestic. |
Weaver, MGen Paul -- impact of anthrax vaccine on ANG retention
| DoD Spin: "But
when it really gets down to it, we've had 10,700 people
inoculated for anthrax in the Air National Guard, with
one known refusal." Testimony before Congress, 29 Sep 1999 Fact: "The reason members of the 103rd Fighter Wing of the Connecticut Air National Guard based at Bradley Field outside of Hartford were being given these shots is that they're scheduled to deploy to the Gulf later this year. And therefore, because we are giving these shots first to people going to Southwest Asia, and, secondly, to people in or going to Korea, and then after that, people who are likely to deploy to these or other hot spots, they're in line to get these shots. So I think eight or nine people have resigned rather than take the shots." DoD press briefing, 21 Jan 1999 |
Weaver, MGen Paul -- on his false testimony to Congress
| DoD Spin: "So,
I was very much aware, when I said one refusal... that
was a refusal of a person who had a commitment to the Air
National Guard. My additional testimony also reflects
that I was also very much aware that people did... .did
walk who... again... were volunteers of our Air National
Guard Family." Closed Circuit Videoteleconference to ANG, 26 Oct 1999 (not available online) Fact: "...we have become aware that in response to a question from the field regarding this matter, you indicated it was understood that you were referring to individuals "with a commitment" as opposed to those who had no commitment. We find nothing in the hearing transcript that so limits your description of the documented "refusal." |
West, MGen Randall (USMC) -- disappointment with the congressional [Shays] report
| DoD Spin: Reporter: "You expressed some disappointment with the congressional report... Is Congress simply stirring the pot here without a lot of facts behind it? GEN. WEST: "I'll stop short of saying that. I'm sure that their motives are well-intended, as ours are. But what I do believe is that there are a lot of people out there that are opposing our anthrax vaccine program for a lot of different reasons. I think some of them are against vaccines in general. I think some of them don't think we need as big a military as we've got or as much military spending or as much research as we're doing. And I think that they came together and they became very active, and there are a lot of people out there opposing this now for a lot of different reasons, and I think that they've flooded the Internet and the web system with information that doesn't have to stand the test of legality and validity and science and medical responsibility that what we say and do and write does. And I think that that's caused a lot of people to be misled about this program." Fact: "These isolating attitudes, while perhaps most extreme in the Marines, are also found in varying degrees elsewhere in the military. "There is a deep-seated suspicion in the U.S. military of society," Andrew Bacevich, a retired Army colonel who is the executive director of the Foreign Policy Institute at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, told me in an interview. It is "part of the Vietnam hangover -- 'You guys betrayed us once, and you could do it again.'" This suspicion, he added, "isn't going away, it's being transmitted" to a new generation of officers." by Tom Ricks, The Atlantic Monthly, July 1997 Fact: Many of the Congressmen on the House Government Reform Committee who were the primary catalysts behind the six hearings that formed the basis of Rep Christopher Shays' report are Republicans who have strong records of supporting defense spending. When he announced his report, Rep Shays said of those who testified against the vaccine, "These people were not troublemakers or conspiracy theorists. They were not malingerers looking to duck tough duty. They are among the most level-headed, dedicated and patriotic Americans it has ever been my privilege to meet. They deserve a better vaccine, and a better vaccination program." Congressional press briefing releasing the subcommittee report, 17 Feb 2000 Fact: On 14 Jan 2000, MGen West met for three hours with one current and one retired USAF Reserve officer, each with over twenty years of military experience. These officers informed him of serious concerns with the safety and efficacy of the vaccine, doctrinal shortcomings of its use, and ethical lapses in the implementation of the DoD anthrax vaccine policy. He was told explicitly that opposition to the anthrax vaccine policy is from American servicemembers who volunteered to serve their country -- and still desire to do so -- not from an internet fringe element. Fact: In Dec 1999, MGen West met for an hour with an USAF Reserve lieutenant colonel who is afflicted with chronic joint pain, inflammation, and arthritis following the anthrax vaccinations. He informed MGen West that the DoD anthrax vaccination policy had caused 50 percent of the pilots in his C-5 squadron to leave and that this was happening throughout the reserve components. |