Threat of Unconventional Terrorism Is Overstated, Study Says

by Judith Miller

New York Times

October 26, 2000

The threat of terrorism involving chemical and germ weapons has been highly exaggerated, and much of the federal government's response to this small, but growing challenge is wasteful and ill-conceived, according to a new study of the administration's domestic emergency preparedness programs by a Washington-based research center.

The 319-page study, published yesterday by the Henry L. Stimson Center, a nonprofit public policy research organization, concludes, among other things, that the administration should stop initiating emergency preparedness training programs and abolish the expensive National Guard teams established to help states and cities in the event of a chemical or germ warfare attack.

The study, written by Amy Smithson, an expert on chemical warfare and the director of the center's program on stopping the spread of chemical and germ weapons, also says the government has "grossly underfunded" programs with Russia to prevent about 10,000 important Soviet germ and chemical weapons scientists from being recruited by terrorists or states like Iran and Iraq that the State Department says support terrorism.

Ms. Smithson bases her critique of the government's counterterrorism programs on almost two years of interviews with police officials, firefighters, paramedics, emergency managers, health care personnel and public health officials in 30 cities in 25 states and on private and government studies of different aspects of the federal emergency preparedness effort. Blame resides within the Clinton administration, she concludes, for letting "pork" take precedence "over preparedness," and in Congress, where committees have "authorized virtually any program with terrorism in the title."

Overall spending on counterterrorism, the study says, rose to $10.2 billion in this year's budget from $5.7 billion in 1996. Within those budgets, money for combating unconventional terrorism — or attacks involving nuclear, biological or chemical weapons — more than doubled in the last two years, to $1.5 billion in 2000 from $645 million in 1998.

"Throwing money at a problem is a costly substitute for effective government," the report concludes.

P. J. Crowley, a White House spokesman, said that while White House officials had not seen the report, the administration was steadily improving the nation's ability to respond to chemical or biological attack or crisis. "Three years ago, we had no capability to deal domestically with chemical, biological, radiological or cyber threats," Mr. Crowley said. "Today, we have built a foundation that allows us to anticipate, identify and, if necessary, respond to these emerging threats."

Ms. Smithson also criticizes the federal government for underfinancing what she argues is the most important means of detecting a covert biological attack on the United States, the disease surveillance system. In 2000, only $222 million, or about 14 percent, of the unconventional-terrorism budgets was allocated to hospital preparations, public health infrastructure and biomedical research. Only 6 percent of the budget was devoted to strengthening public hospitals, clinics and emergency health facilities that would be overwhelmed in a chemical or germ terrorist attack.

On the other hand, the study finds, Washington has thrown money at emergency response teams of dubious value. Ms. Smithson singles out a program that in the last two years has cost more than $134.7 million to prepare and train National Guard teams to help states and cities in the event of a germ or chemical terrorist attack. No team would arrive in time to help local populations and the teams are technically inept, she contends. The National Guard, moreover, is building a $60 million "first responder" training facility in West Virginia, although the Justice Department already has such a center at Fort McClellan, in Alabama.

For the $3.5 million cost of starting, equipping and training one National Guard Civil Support Team, Ms. Smithson states, "2,333 hospitals or fire stations could be outfitted with decontamination capabilities."

Charles Cragin, an assistant secretary of defense, disagreed with the criticism, asserting that some Guard teams would arrive within four hours of being called, and that they had performed well in exercises.

The lack of federal coordination, the report states, has led to the creation of about 90 terrorism preparedness courses with different missions, resources and requirements, resulting in "a confusing mess that has left officials outside Washington uneasy and frustrated."

Much of the training money never reaches the states and localities, but rather stays "within the Beltway," Ms. Smithson said.

The preparedness programs, the study adds, focus "disproportionately on the on-scene sirens and rescue components of unconventional terrorism response" and too little on strengthening the public health system against diseases that could emerge through a terrorist attack or a natural epidemic.